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CHAPTER 5 
HYBRID LOCAL OWNERSHIP IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND 
KOSOVO: FROM DISCURSIVE TO MATERIAL ASPECTS OF 
OWNERSHIP 
Stefanie Kappler and Nicolas Lemay-Hébert
1
 
 
Introduction  
Although local ownership seems to have been embraced almost as a consensus in the 
peacebuilding world and literature, the recent protests in Bosnia-Herzegovina
2
 have outlined 
the failed agenda of gradually transferring the ownership of peacebuilding structures and 
policies from international to local actors. Instead, what we see is a mass uprising against the 
underlying conditions of the peace- and statebuilding project as a whole, questioning its 
legitimacy and pointing to the need to rethink the often imposing ways of ownership 
transferral. Instead of leading to sustainable forms of co-owned peace between a variety of 
actors, local ownership has often been locally perceived as patronising and only superficially 
connected to local needs.  
On an international level, after a decade of evolution toward more ‘integrated,’ ‘multi-
faceted,’ or simply stated more intrusive peace operations, with the high point being the 
United Nations administrations of Kosovo and Timor-Leste at the beginning of this century, 
the peacebuilding literature has started to take heed of the “unintended consequences” agenda 
                                                          
1
 Earlier versions of this manuscript have been presented at the workshop on “Local Governance and 
Peacebuilding”, Bradford, UK, 29-30 August 2013, and at the Second Annual Conference of the International 
Association for Peace and Conflict Studies, Manchester, UK, 12-13 September 2013. The authors would like to 
thank the organisers and the participants for their comments 
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 BiH or Bosnia from here onwards. 
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(Aoi, de Coning and Thakur 2007; Hull et al. 2009) to integrate in its analysis all facets of 
interventions and not only those accounted for traditionally by peacebuilding actors 
themselves. Debates around sovereignty and rules of engagement, which were so central in 
the first half of the 1990s (Thakur and Thaker 1995), gave way to discussions on authority 
and international administrations at the end of the 1990s (Lemay-Hébert 2012b), which 
constituted to a certain extent “the last stage of the teleological evolution of the UN as the 
central player in the human quest for world order” (Adibe 1998: 112). However, the difficult 
experiences in Iraq, Timor-Leste and Kosovo led in turn to new discussions on the means of 
intervention, and to a renewed interest in the concept of local ownership. In this context, local 
ownership is understood as a process where the solutions to a particular society’s needs are 
developed in concert with the people who are going to live with, and uphold, these solutions 
in the long run (Hansen and Wiharta 2007; see also Donais 2012). 
In the peacebuilding context, and after having been a preeminent architect of the international 
administrations in Kosovo
3
 and Timor-Leste, Kofi Annan rediscovered the virtues of 
recognising local agency before passing the relay to Ban Ki-Moon. In 2002, national 
ownership suddenly becomes “the single most important determinant of the effectiveness of 
capacity-building programmes” (UN 2002). In Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in 
Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, Kofi Annan recognised that no international initiative 
“imposed from the outside can hope to be successful or sustainable.” In this context, “the role 
of the United Nations and the international community should be solidarity, not substitution” 
(UN 2004: para. 17). He notably restated this view at the opening session of the newly 
established Peacebuilding Commission, noting for instance that “peacebuilding requires 
national ownership, and must be homegrown. Outsiders, however well-intentioned, cannot 
substitute for the knowledge and will of the people of the country concerned” (UN 2006). 
                                                          
3
 The idea of an international administration in Kosovo was first expressed by Annan on 3 May 1999 in a private 
meeting (Kreilkamp 2002: 643). 
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While not being as proactive as his predecessor in the sphere of norms creation and diffusion, 
Ban Ki-Moon all but pursued the same peacebuilding agenda set by Kofi Annan in the last 
years of his secretaryship, restating the importance of local ownership at the Peacebuilding 
Commission (UN 2007) and in reports on peacebuilding submitted at the General Assembly 
and the Security Council (UN 2009). Local ownership to a certain extent reflects his “do 
more with less” approach (UN 2011). 
The ‘local ownership turn was greeted with mixed reception in the peacebuilding literature. 
On the one hand, the ‘problem solving’ literature welcomes it as a way to bolster the process 
of international institutional promotion of global norms of good governance. An appropriate 
transfer of powers to legitimate local representatives allows external statebuilders more time 
for as sustainable completion of the mandate while giving more time to the host society “to 
develop the ground for a sound political and civic culture” (Narten 2009: 279). In this regard, 
local ownership, as well as discussion on how to increase participation and consultation, is 
understood as integral to the “sequencing debate” (Paris 2004: 179-211; Barnett 2006). 
Ownership is seen as a decisive condition to increase the quality and accountability of 
interventions (Pouligny 2009: 5).  
On the other hand, the critical literature generally portrays the local ownership turn as a 
“rhetorical device” (Scheye and Peake 2005: 240; Richmond 2012: 362) or “rhetorical cover” 
(Chandler 2011: 87), more aspirational than concrete (Reich 2006: 7) and used to legitimize 
external control (Wilén 2009: 348; Newman 2009: 50). The statement “there is much talk of 
ownership, but often this is not much more than lip service” (Boege et al. 2009: 29) seems to 
encapsulate the general argument made by this eclectic group of scholars – an argument 
generally supported by extensive empirical research. Power redistribution – implied in the 
local ownership discourse – is considered marginal and does not involve a fundamental 
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rethinking of the meaning and location of power (Mac Ginty 2011: 45). Hence, the term 
ownership is understood to imply “varying degrees of local control that are typically not 
realized” (Chesterman 2007: 21). 
Against this background, this chapter opens up the debate by distinguishing two distinct 
dimensions of ownership: social and material. As such, this chapter aims to fill a gap in the 
literature on ownership, where most scholars focus on social aspects of peacebuilding 
ownership while marginalising its material implications. Instead of a debate revolving around 
the limited or unrestricted potential of local ownership, the inclusion of those two dimensions 
of ownership enables us to present a more subtle account of peacebuilding processes, where 
ownership can at the same time be discursive and material, whilst also deep and superficial. 
This chapter will argue that local ownership in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosnia or BiH) and in 
Kosovo was of a distinctly hybrid form, with on the one hand, the omnipresence of 
cooptation practices and discursive use of the local ownership jargon (both from international 
and local actors), and on the other hand, a deeper material ownership encompassing situations 
where there is socialisation process for locals into donor structures as well as donors 
socialisation into local practices, a situation that leads in the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo 
more to dependency creation than to an imaginary endgame of endogenous and sustainable 
development in the region.  
 
The rise of the local ownership agenda in the Balkans 
The liberal peacebuilding agenda took a specific, yet intertwined, route in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Kosovo. Both cases have shown the limits of external interventionism when 
conceived as direct administration or heavy-handedness, leading to a renewed interest in local 
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ownership. Both cases are also related in many ways: through shared history of course,
4
 but 
also through the ‘lessons learned’ discourse by internationals, with experience from one case 
spilling over the decision making of the second.  
The international architecture following the 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, known as the Dayton Accord, is particularly complex and 
singular. First, Security Council Resolution 1031 (1995), in accordance with the Dayton 
Accord, endorsed the establishment of a High Representative to “mobilize and, as 
appropriate, give guidance to, and coordinate the activities of the civilian organizations and 
agencies” involved with the civilian aspects of the peace agreement. Additionally to the 
Office of the High Representative (OHR), Security Council Resolution 1035 established the 
United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) and a United Nations civilian office, 
brought together as the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMBiH). The 
UNMBiH had a relatively minimal role in terms of civilian affairs, whereas the real executive 
power rested with the OHR. Even if the UNMBiH, “through a combination of mission creep 
and sometimes combative relations with the High Representative” (Chesterman 2004: 76-77) 
ultimately exercised a wide range of functions related to demining, humanitarian relief, 
human rights, elections and rehabilitation of infrastructure and economic reconstruction, the 
civilian presence was mostly assured by the OHR, with the High Representative supervising 
the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement in the political realm. 
After a first period marked by a low-key approach by the OHR, combined with a 
consolidation of Serb, Bosniak and Croat hard-line position, and frustrated by the manifest 
lack of progress, the OHR saw its prerogatives considerably expanded after the Bonn Summit 
of the Peace Implementation Council of December 1997. In the words of the former High 
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 An interesting point was made by LSE researchers, showing that for local partners in Bosnia and Kosovo, local 
ownership relates more to property rights (due to government control of companies) than to political control 
(Martin et al. 2012: 4). 
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Representative Wolfgang Petritsch, the introduction of the so-called “Bonn Powers” “shifted 
the equation of the international presence in favour of the civilian implementation efforts and 
brought Bosnia closer to a protectorate-like status” (2004: 12). Indeed, Petritsch started to 
dismiss more and more public officials, from mayors up to members of the collective State 
Presidency for obstruction against the implementation of the Dayton Accord. Moreover, the 
OHR immediately started an integrationist legislation for state and society by decreeing laws 
on citizenship, the flag, the national anthem, the currency, ethnically neutral licence plates 
and passports: all laws the nationalist parties could not agree on in the Parliamentary 
Assembly. These powers “were abundantly used” in Bosnia (Cousens and Harland: 101; 
Knaus and Martin 2003: 66), which had repercussions on the social fabric of the Bosnian 
society (Belloni 2001; Kappler 2013; Kappler and Richmond 2011). 
In Kosovo, following the NATO Operation Allied Force that expelled the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia’s forces out of Kosovo, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 
1244 on 10 June 1999. The resolution established an international civil and security presence 
to administer Kosovo, UNMIK and the NATO-led Kosovo Force respectively. The United 
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)’s mandate as stipulated in 
Resolution 1244 was threefold: to establish a functioning interim civil administration, to 
promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government, and finally to 
facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo’s future status. One innovative feature of 
the mandate was the concentration of powers to the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General. Strictly speaking, there is no separation of powers in the framework of the 
international administration of Kosovo: executive, legislative, and judicial authority are 
vested in a single individual, the transitional administrator (Caplan 2005, p. 196). The 
challenges of externally-led statebuilding have been noted by various contributions (see for 
instance: Hehir 2006; King and Mason 2006; Lemay-Hébert 2013; Visoka 2011). 
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The overall international experiment in Bosnia can certainly be described, as the former High 
Representative Wolfgang Petritsch states, as a “watershed experience” that defined the 
evolution of future peace missions, especially in the Balkans (quoted in Bose 2002: 108). 
According to another former High Representative Lord Paddy Ashdown, one of the lessons 
of the Bosnian experience was the necessity to grant effective authority to the peace mission 
from the start: “it is vital to go in with the authority you need from the start. (...) On the 
civilian side, this means starting off with the powers needed to get the job done, rather than 
having to acquire them later, as we did in Bosnia to our cost” (2004). Similarly, the EU 
Administrator Hans Koschnick in Mostar, when reflecting on his experience, said that his 
greatest mistake during the first year was “not to take over the control immediately and to 
impose basic freedoms at that point vigorously” (quoted in: Korhonen 2001: 517). These 
lessons will be kept in mind once the UN would be confronted with the problem Kosovo in 
1998-1999. In fact, as Paddy Ashdown unambiguously noted: 
 
history will look back on our engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina as the 
first faltering step toward a doctrine of international community. Bosnia will 
be seen as a new model for international intervention -- one designed not to 
pursue narrow national interests but to prevent conflict, to promote human 
rights and to rebuild war-torn societies. We are already applying the lessons of 
Bosnia in Kosovo, East Timor and Afghanistan. Perhaps they will be applied 
in Iraq as well (2002, A25) 
 
Corroborating Ashdown’s interpretation of Bosnia’s ‘lessons learned,’ the former High 
Representative Carlos Westendorp advocated a ‘full international protectorate’ for Kosovo: 
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“it may last for a few years. Yes, this disregards the principles of sovereignty, but so what? 
This is not the moment for post-colonial sensitivity. Besides, there is no other way of 
guaranteeing the security of the people who live in Kosovo, be they Serbs or Albanians” 
(Westendorp 1999). This is an analysis that was also shared by various International Crisis 
Group reports and by op-eds in major newspapers at that time (Lemay-Hébert 2011).  
A few years later, the tone was clearly less triumphant, both in Bosnia and Kosovo. 
Discussions on norm imposition and international administration gave way to a new-found 
interest in local ownership processes. After a period of heavy OHR intervention into local 
politics under Paddy Ashdown, the former High Representative Christian Schwartz-Schilling 
saw his role in his capacity “to oversee the transition from today’s quasi-protectorate to local 
ownership” (2006). In that respect, it could be observed that ownership increasingly became 
part and parcel of the European Union’s increasing engagement in the country. The need to 
close the Office of the High Representative as one of the conditions for EU membership 
made clear that the EU wanted to take less responsibility for the political fate of the country 
and to include a sovereign BiH as a member state.  
The ownership debate between the EU and local partners was conducted through policies of 
conditionality, or a carrot and stick approach. An increasing focus on local ownership is not 
least due to the failure of the EU’s attempt to embark on local trusteeship projects taking over 
governance functions on the local and communal level, for instance by appointing a European 
Union Administrator in Mostar. This project had turned out to be a failure in terms of neither 
managing to establish a joint city administration nor an adequate refugee return mechanism to 
counter the ethnic division of the city (Cox 1998). Therefore, the instrument of Pre-Accession 
Assistance (IPA), signed in 2008, placed emphasis on institution- and capacity-building in the 
light of eventual accession to the EU.  
9 
 
However, while strengthening such aspects of the gradual transferral of local ownership over 
institutions, the EU has in parallel been criticised of implicitly reinforcing control 
mechanisms through the imposition of conditionalities (Merlingen and Ostrauskaité 2006). In 
pursuit of local ownership, the EU has promoted public campaigns, such as “Put u Evropu 
zavisi od vas” (“The way into Europe depends on you”), which however did not manage to 
overcome resistance to EU electoral laws in parliament and mirrors the extent to which 
European symbolism has sometimes been overestimated (Coles 2007). On the one hand, the 
EU has realised that ‘local ownership’ is needed to create and maintain the legitimacy of the 
peacebuilding process – at least in rhetorical terms. On the other hand, it can be observed that 
the concept of ownership has often failed to transcend a rather superficial approach, in which 
processes are only handed over to locals if the latter are expected to support rather than 
undermine the EU’s policies. Not only does civil society represent a subcontractor for the EU 
to be able to implement its policies such as democratisation and reconciliation, but at the 
same time it serves as a legitimating device for the EU to claim local legitimacy and 
ownership rather than imposition (European Commission 2006).  
The debates around local ownership increasingly came to be centered around police reform, 
which the EU took responsibility for, but which was often criticised as even undermining 
ownership rather than strengthening it (cf. Merlingen and Ostrauskaité 2006). The EU’s lack 
of trust in its initial approach to strengthen local ownership in different institutions was 
seconded by the High Representative Lajčák, who argued in favour of a more robust 
approach to intervention: “We Must Act Robustly And Creatively” (OHR 2007a). Venneri, 
perhaps controversially, argues that, rather than leading to local ownership, international 
reform programmes have instead been conquered and manipulated by local elites (2013). 
What becomes clear is the fact that there has constantly been a tension on the part of 
10 
 
internationals between the perceived need to control and the rhetoric of creating ownership 
locally to be able to gradually withdraw from what has become a costly undertaking. 
In Kosovo, the progressive handover of supervision competencies to the European Union and 
to the International Civilian Office (ICO) after Pristina’s unilateral declaration of 
independence gave the chance for internationals to reflect on the international experiment so 
far. Torbjorn Sohlstrom, Head of International Civilian Office Preparation Team, stated in 
2007 that the new international presence “will have a very different relationship with the 
authorities of Kosovo.” He further emphasized that “the international community will no 
longer seek to govern Kosovo. People often suggest that the ICO will be the successor of 
UNMIK. That is not the intention.” While the ICO is likely to retain rights to intervene, 
Sohlstrom notes that “unlike the situation in Kosovo today, and unlike the situation in Bosnia, 
such powers would be clearly limited and clearly defined.” (Sohlstrom 2007: 50). Sohlstrom 
is not alone in his defense of a new approach for the international presence in Kosovo. For 
instance, Christina Gallach, spokesperson of Javier Solana, stated that “the basic role will not 
be the one of supplanting the local authorities. The local authorities will assume fully their 
responsibilities and they will have to develop every single aspect of authority that is going to 
be given to them. But the EU will definitely do the mentoring, monitoring with reduced 
aspects of executive powers” (South East Europe TV Exchanges 2007). Another EU official, 
Caspar Klynge, reinforced the parallel with the OHR by mentioning that “the plan is to 
provide the EU with a similar authority as the Senior High Representative in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, so that it could intervene politically by annulling decisions and replacing 
officials who were in breach of laws” (NATO Parliamentary Assembly 2006: para. 20).5 For 
                                                          
5
 Officials in Brussels and Washington have often used the OHR in Bosnia as a reference for the establishment 
of the ICO (Interviews in Washington and Brussels quoted in ICO 2012: 76), even if the ICO leadership prided 
itself on not becoming Bosnia’s OHR (ICO 2012: 85). 
5
 In addition to the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX), and the remnants of the still valid UNSC Resolution 
1244: UNMIK and NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR). 
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the International Civilian Representative Pieter Feith, the focus on local ownership was clear: 
“I am working on the basis of local ownership and I am more an advisor than an 
administrator” (2008: 3). Even if the Ahtisaari Plan vested the ICO with executive authority 
to supervise Kosovo’s political development, Feith acknowledged that “has not felt the need 
to exercise these powers – mainly out of respect for the principle of local ownership and 
responsibility” (Feith 2009: 4).  
Hence, the local ownership agenda in Kosovo became a priority for international officials 
through the realisation of the limits of external rule between 1999 and 2004. After a period of 
progressive hand-over of competencies from UNMIK to local institutions between 2004 and 
2008, Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008 opened up a new 
chapter of international supervision, marked by the establishment of the ICO, mandated to 
oversee the progressive application of Ahtisaari’s Plan.6 The approach taken was a “more 
than Skopje but less than Sarajevo” formula (ICO 2012: 6), and the ICR has focused on the 
supervisory aspects of his mandate without relying on the use of direct, executive powers 
(Hill and Linden-Retek 2010: 34). This “fast-track progress toward local ownership” (ICO 
2012: 68)
7
 had as much to do with the realisation that the ICR worked in an environment 
“where irate members of the Kosovar/Albanian and Kosovar/Serbian communities did not 
have the appetite for yet another ‘occupying’ mission in Kosovo” (ICO 2012: 59) than the 
constraints related to its relations with Quint members
8
 and other embassies in Pristina (ICO 
2012: 68). The closure of the ICO in September 2012, as well as the Belgrade-Pristina 
agreement on technical cooperation in April 2013, marked the beginning of a yet another 
                                                          
6
 In addition to the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX), and the remnants of the still valid UNSC Resolution 
1244: UNMIK and NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR). 
7
 Interestingly enough, local ownership is understood as a state (the final stage of independence) as well as a 
process by the ICO. Another example is when the ICO refers to a “leaner international presence that would 
allow Kosovo to transfer to local ownership at the earliest opportunity” (ICO 2012: 69). 
8
 Quint countries include France, Germany, Italy, the UK, and the US. 
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chapter of supervision of Kosovo, this time revolving around EU neighbourhood and 
accession policy.  
 
Social and material ownership in Bosnia and Kosovo  
Against the background of our claim that ownership can be superficial or deep, social or 
material in nature, we argue that different ownership constellations are possible. While 
peacebuilding actors tend to hope for the creation of deep social ownership structures in the 
long run, we suggest here that peace- and state-building tends to lead to deep material 
ownership, which is less sustainable due to the dependency of the intervention on material 
resources. The following two examples of Bosnia and Kosovo both reflect this tendency.   
Ownership in BiH 
The issue of local ownership has been addressed and viewed as one of the main challenges 
for Bosnia’s reconstruction period by a number of international players (OHR 2007b; 
Delegation of the European Commission to BiH 2007; UNDP 2010; OSCE Mission to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 2009). At the same time, most agencies seem to explicitly state a lack of 
local ownership over the peacebuilding process. Particularly in interviews with World Bank, 
EU and OHR representatives between 2008 and 2011, the lack of ownership was emphasised 
as one of the most pressing challenges of post-conflict Bosnia. This problem was mainly 
ascribed to the nature of cooperation with local authorities, which were often viewed as 
complex or even problematic.
9
 At the same time, the local population seems to be more 
divided about the need to strengthen ownership, or alternatively, whether to ask for even 
stronger degrees of intervention (cf. Kostic 2008). 
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 Xavier Oleiro-Ogando, Delegation of the EU in BiH, personal interview, Sarajevo, 15/03/10. 
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Interestingly enough, however, neither local nor international narratives tend to define the 
concrete meaning of ownership, and a linkage between material and social ownership is taken 
for granted. Instead, from an institutional perspective, local ownership is viewed as a political 
process, which is expected to spill over into diverse elements of society, both socio-political 
and economic. The EU, for instance, understands ownership as the attempt to make people 
responsible for their own decisions, ideally through passing on knowledge to people from the 
EU, that is, from EU practice to local partners.
10
  
Yet, while this approach seems to suggest a long-term involvement in political change, what 
we can observe in actual practice is a strong link between international institutions and local 
actors on a material level, while those links hardly turn into long-term social attachments to 
the peace that is being built. In this respect, it is striking to observe that whenever actors, such 
as NGO staff, but also Bosnian politicians in and outside Sarajevo, speak about their 
relationship with the international community, they tend to focus on the financial aspects of 
cooperation. Grant applications and financial support seem to be the key benefits of 
international peacebuilding, while there is hardly ever any mentioning of a joint vision or 
normative system of attachment. The aspect of international peacebuilding which seems to 
feed into local practice is therefore a socialisation into donor structures instead of joint 
agenda of hybrid peacebuilding, of which local actors take ownership. Interviewees often 
mentioned the need to obtain better access to funding and to obtain training to improve their 
funding proposals.
11
 In this context, it has been suggested that people are very clever in 
figuring out what donors want to hear,
12
 while mutual engagement with their social and 
normative agendas between donors and recipients seems to remain limited. In that respect, 
the attachment to peace in mere financial / material terms suggests a clear path towards the 
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 Xavier Oleiro Ogando, Delegation of the EU in BiH, personal interview, Sarajevo, 08/03/10. 
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 S.Magdalena Schildknecht, Narko-Ne, personal interview, Sarajevo, 11/03/10. 
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creation of material ownership. However, this does not result in sustainable forms of social 
ownership of the peace being created, but instead means that the subjects of peacebuilding 
only feel the need to engage with the resources underpinning peacebuilding and its associated 
political economy.  
On the part of local recipients, this is often framed as a lack of a vision of actors such as the 
EU, which is perceived as lacking inspiration, meaningful content and vibration, being 
focused on the business-aspects of peace.
13
 This is linked to a more general perception of the 
international community as not very engaged in the contents of peace,
14
 despite the fact that it 
has spent considerable amounts of money on peacebuilding in Bosnia. An NGO 
representative has even emphasised that, although the government feeds and creates NGOs 
by sustaining them with international money, instead of facilitating locally owned 
peacebuilding and connecting citizens to government, this has only reinforced the status 
quo.
15
 
At the same time, this observation of a failure to translate the ownership of material 
resources, often in the form of project money and grants, into socially sustainable attachment 
to peace, is not only an observation at the grassroots. A staff member of the OHR, for 
instance, explained that the OHR feeds money into big projects, while such resources often 
end up in the pockets of those who are at the origin of conflict.
16
 In that respect, this creates a 
situation of ‘feeding the hand that bites you’17, and rather than facilitating local discussions 
about the nature of peace being built, this approach risks creating further structures of 
exclusion and disempowerment. This focus on the material aspects of ownership, which is 
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 Nihad Kresevljakovic, MESS, personal interview, Sarajevo, 01/04/10; Sanel Huskic, ACIPS, personal 
interview, Sarajevo, 15/03/10; Nebojsa Savija-Valha, Ambrosia, personal interview, Sarajevo, 23/03/10. 
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 Pierre Courtin, Duplex Gallery, personal interview, Sarajevo, 06/04/10. 
15
 Nebojsa Savija-Valha, NDC, personal interview, Sarajevo, 12/03/09. 
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 Confidential source, OHR staff, personal interview, Banja Luka, 27/04/10. 
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clearly non-negligible, means that peacebuilding risks turning into a professionalised, 
administrative exercise, instead losing the focus on social sustainability and on the conditions 
under which it can be locally owned and negotiated.  
NGOs, such as Mozaik, an organisation based in Sarajevo and pursuing a variety of projects 
throughout the country, which are well funded, need to concentrate a large part of their 
energies on the administrative aspects of their work. Staff emphasised their need to maintain 
a professionalised finance department as well as keeping good links to a variety of donors, 
including the World Bank, UNDP and the EU.
18
 This example clearly reflects a deep 
socialisation into donors’ funding structures and a commitment to responding to those. 
However, it is not fully clear to what extent a professionalization of organisational structures 
will eventually lead to a greater local attachment to peace and peacebuilding.  
International actors do realise this issue indeed, particularly in a phase of the reconstruction 
effort in which resources are shrinking. In this context, a representative of a Bosnian NGO 
reported during a meeting with representatives of the European Commission, the latter 
emphasised that NGOs in the Western Balkans now needed to learn ‘to grow up’ and stand 
on their own feet to be able to survive.
19
 In a similar vein, the OHR seems to be concerned 
that local people will be unable to resolve their political issues without the intervention of the 
High Representative – as the recent intervention of the High Representative in the context of 
Bosnia’s ‘babylution’ has shown (cf. Armakolas and Maksimovic 2013). This is not least due 
to a low level of trust in local agencies. There seems to be a belief among a number of 
internationals that Bosnians do not necessarily vote in their best interest and can easily be 
fooled by the media.
20
 Similarly, local elites (perhaps more so in the Federation than in 
Republika Srpska) rely on external intervention. An MP, for instance, said that she expected 
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 Vesna Bajsanski-Agic, Mozaik, personal interview, Sarajevo, 24/03/10. 
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20
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the OHR to intervene in the delayed process of government formation in 2010/11 in terms of 
implementing the election results in the three cantons in which no local agreement could be 
found.
21
 This, however, means that attachment to international peacebuilding policies does 
exist, which is strong on a material level.  
On a socio-political level, however, attachment seems more fragmented and superficial 
(relying on intervention to solve problems that cannot be solved locally rather than out of a 
commitment to its normative underpinnings). Such processes illustrate the lack of mutual in-
depth engagement between donors and recipients, that is, a process kickstarting a process of 
ownership transferral beyond superficial lip-service. The latter is often necessary to gain 
access to funding, but points to a lack of a common discursive agenda around peace and 
peacebuilding. Yet, the divergent visions of peace between a number of local actors and 
international agencies precludes a process during the course of which strong attachment to 
the social underpinnings of peacebuilding can develop (Kappler 2012). Instead, those actors 
which are keen to bring about genuine transformation sometimes withdraw from international 
funding to be able to act freely, the artist association Ambrosia being one example. The 
organisers decided to self-fund their activities to be able to act more freely.  
In that sense, material attachment, which is rather strong in BiH, does not necessarily lead to 
deep social attachment. Ownership of peacebuilding seems to be mostly material, linked to a 
socialisation into donor discourses and procedures, and dependent on the availability of 
resources. Yet, particularly in the light of shrinking resources, a long-term social engagement 
and debate about the meanings and agents of peacebuilding does not seem to result from this. 
Local ownership of peacebuilding thus resists and coopts against the background that 
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accommodation and acceptance of peacebuilding policies only happen when there is a clear 
convergence of interests and visions of peace.  
Ownership in Kosovo 
The social field of international-local relations in Kosovo has been marked by a few constants 
that characterise the level of social attachment in Kosovo, including: 1) various benchmarks 
imposed by international custodians throughout the years – from Steiner’s Standards Before 
Status in 2002 to the Comprehensive Peace Proposal also known as the Ahtisaari Plan in 
2007 – each plan being met with a mix of either ambivalence, reluctant acceptance and 
sometimes overt resistance; 2) co-optation and instrumentalisation strategies employed both 
by international and local officials to achieve their own goals, distorting in the process the 
content and meaning of the ‘values’ being exported in Kosovo; 3) and a constant focus on 
‘stability’ from an international perspective, coupled with the reduction of social interactions 
to their simplest inter-ethnic component.  
As an OSCE official mentioned when asked about the various benchmarks in Kosovo: “if 
Kosovo were successful in applying all standards, it would be a paradise on earth.”22 In 
effect, the standards – a succession of hoops that Kosovars had to jump into to be seen as 
“worthy of being free”23 – have been widely considered by locals as a necessary evil to 
achieve full international recognition by the international community. Opposed to them when 
seen as an unsubtle way to delay independence – Steiner’s “standards to prevent status” being 
a good example in the words of the former Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary 
General Jock Covey (2005: 121) – grudgingly abiding by them when associated with a status-
positive institution like the ICO, the success of standards promotion has varied depending on 
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the nature of the local and international context and the identity of the actor promoting the 
standards.  
All of these attempts have been greeted with partial success (or failure, depending on the 
interpretation): in 2004 and 2005, the Eide reports put an end to standards implementation, 
making clear that “while standards implementation in Kosovo has been uneven, the time has 
come to move to the next phase of the political process” (UN 2005). The “next phase of the 
political process” actually consisted of yet another set of standards, this time included in the 
Ahtisaari Plan, and supervised by the ICO between 2008 and 2012. When the International 
Steering Group agreed to put an end to “supervised independence” in Kosovo in a meeting in 
July 2012 on the basis that “Kosovo has implemented the terms of the Comprehensive 
Settlement Proposal”, this bold statement was understood by the ICO itself as “desirable in 
order to avoid too much debate around the details” and as the result of an effort “to re-
interpret and re-define what ‘implementation’ would look like” (ICO 2012: 133). Hence, 
while the standards promotion agenda has structured social relations between internationals 
and locals throughout the years, it has been consistently watered down, according to the 
political requirements of the moment.  
Integral to the process are the co-optation policies that have been central since the very 
beginning, used by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of UN Kouchner to 
dissolve parallel structures and to consolidate UN authority south of the Ibar River in 1999 
for instance (Lemay-Hébert 2012a), at least until the Kosovar leaders realised that local 
“consultation” was indeed very limited. Instrumentalisation of the international policies has 
also been displayed by local actors, using the language of liberal peace to secure international 
support (Franks and Richmond 2008; Narten 2008). Interestingly enough, Kosovar politicians 
are suddenly being less receptive to norms promotion after realising that the International 
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Civilian Representative was reluctant to use his executive powers –delaying appointments of 
minority-reserved ministerial positions, or tolerating and promoting rampant corruption in all 
sectors of civic and political life (ICO 2012: 69). Also they were being more assertive and 
“less pliant” on minority issues after ICJ’s advisory opinion favourable to Pristina (ICO 
2012: 50).  
Finally, a third element that calibrates the level of attachment to peace in Kosovo is the 
constant focus on stability and ethnicity by international actors. UNMIK established ethnicity 
as the defining social characteristic in Kosovo, and the international administration embedded 
ethnic identities in the political system, making it a crucial factor in the apportioning of 
power from the start (Hehir 2006). Thus, international custodians did not try to build a “new 
Kosovar nation”, but rather a “multi-ethnic” Kosovo (Pula 2005, 32; Simonsen 2004). This is 
an opinion shared by Albin Kurti of the Le ̈vizja VETËVENDOSJE! movement, for whom the 
internationals “see no people in Kosovo”, only different ethnicities in a process where 
“individuals become random samples of particular collectives” (2011: 91). Not seeing 
potential “Kosovar citizens,” international custodians have from the start identified all 
Kosovars in terms of ethnicity defined as communities (the pervasive K-Albanian, K-Serbian 
discourse), using a filter of ethnicity to “read” the conflict in Kosova in terms reductible for 
purposes of explanation (Blumi 2003: 218-219). It is also an opinion shared by many 
internationals. For instance, for an OSCE official, internationals should have tried to build 
citizenship of Kosovo and not reinforce ethnic loyalties.
24
 There is also a recognition that 
internationals have reinforced ethnic divisions in the country.
25
 For an UNMIK official, the 
multiple layers of positive discrimination imposed by international community has damaged 
the process of inter-ethnic reconciliation by empowering radicals on both sides and 
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perpetuating ethnic division.
26
 At the same time, internationals have unduly focused on a 
restricted understanding of security – especially the security of their personnel – which 
limited the nature of the intervention (King and Mason 2006: 6). As one interviewee put it, 
the internationals “want to keep peace and security, but they are not really interested in 
building a viable democracy”.27 
More importantly, they have mistaken multi-ethnicity with ghettoisation (Lemay-Hébert 
2012b), which became apparent in many discourses. NATO Secretary General Lord 
Robertson noted that “we are going to protect a multi-ethnic society here and we’ll do it if 
necessary by making sure the individual groups are protected in their homes and 
communities. If it involves building walls round them, barbed wire round them, giving them 
the protection they need, then we will do it” (NATO Online Library 2000). A senior UNMIK 
official recognised the dilemma, noting that  “to really protect Kosovo as a multiethnic state -
- in other words, to provide security for the Serbs who wanted to stay -- would have meant 
rapid ghettoization behind protected lines” (Erlanger 1999).  
These points tell a story of limited social attachment to peace. However, the prolonged 
intervention in Kosovo has also produced its own hybrid form of peace. As Albin Kurti 
(2011: 92) notes,  
 
turning thousands of internationals into ‘local internationals’, a different 
species from their compatriots back home. Years of international rule have 
turned local politicians and NGOs into ‘international locals’, a species that 
differs from their compatriots in Kosova. The ‘local internationals’ and the 
                                                          
26
 Alan Packer, UNMIK, personal interview, 12/07/07. 
27
 Lulzim Peci, KIPRED, personal interview, Pristina, 11/07/07 
21 
 
‘international locals’ are kept together by a happy marriage of interest, 
providing the system’s internal cohesion. 
 
These hybrids will lead the consolidation of a material ownership, notably driven by the 
inflow of foreign assistance in Kosovo. During 2000–03, foreign assistance totalled €4.1 
billion, equivalent to over twice Kosovo’s 2003 GDP, and private inflows added another €2.4 
billion (Moalla-Fretini et al, 2005: 5). For the Economy Strategy and Project Identification 
Group, “the overall implications are clear: GDP growth in Kosovo’s economy was driven by 
external transfers, rather than from any lasting increase in the productivity of Kosovo’s 
enterprises” (2004: 7). This inevitably leads to rent seeking behaviour, incentivising the local 
elite to pursue immediate self-enrichment, distorting the economy as a result (Auty 2010). A 
large international presence can disrupt market efficiency and has unintended consequences 
on the social contract binding the government and its population. Rent through aid can reach 
10 to 25% of GDP in developing countries according to numbers compiled by Peter Boone 
(1996), and postwar Kosovo was more on the higher end of that range in that regard.  
While considered massive by scholars and practitioners in Kosovo at that time, the absence of 
reliable economic information makes it hard to precisely quantify rent-seeking practices in 
the aftermath of the intervention. Many different accounts reflect the same image of post-war 
Kosovo, with many Kosovans flocking to Pristina, “looking for work or ‘investment 
opportunities’,” trebling Pristina’s population in 3 years (King and Mason, 2006: 132). Mr. 
Bajrami, head of the Chamber of Commerce at the time, explains for instance that it pays 
better to sell chewing gum to the UN staff than to toil in the fields (Zaremba, 2007), while a 
cleaning lady working for the UN in Pristina earns three to four times more than a 
government minister (Ammitzboell, 2007: 76-77). From the very beginning, “wages paid by 
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the international community as a whole created wage distortions that put serious pressure on 
budgetary decisions” (del Castillo, 2008: 151). It created a ‘bubble economy’, where the 
influx of thousands of international employees provided a huge boost to specific sectors of 
the economy – restaurants, bars and bootleg CD sellers (King and Mason, 2006: 131). While 
the international donor assistance for Kosovo has gradually decreased, from 45 % of 
Kosovo’s general government revenues in 2004 to 27 % in 2010 (Republic of Kosovo, 2011: 
6), it still remains high in comparative terms. Today, economic dysfunction and rampant 
corruption remains a part of the Kosovo landscape (ICO 2012: 79), and the immediate 
challenge for Kosovo is to break with this culture of dependency, which may be difficult 
given the vested interests of a group of actors in the perpetuation of the system.  
 
Conclusion 
We have shown in this chapter that, rather than leading to locally-owned sustainable forms of 
peacebuilding, local ownership has often come to mean a deep socialisation into material 
donor structures. This has partly led to practices of rent-seeking, partly to creative ways of 
accessing international funding. Yet such practices have only rarely materialised into a 
substantive discussion about what a hybrid peace would look like substantially, as the cases 
of Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina illustrate particularly well. Actually, most of the 
literature on ownership focuses on social aspects while marginalising the material 
implications of peacebuilding. As many analyses have shown, the degree to which local 
actors identify with the social components of peace seems rather limited. Shallow and 
superficial social ownership, encompassing logics of co-optation and discursive politics, are 
common occurrences in post-conflict or post-disaster theatres. However, such effects are not 
last due to a lack of interaction between different sets of actors and a platform on which 
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peace is discussed beyond its material implications. The nature of intervention has instead 
tended to be discussed with respect to the material framing of peace, while the more sensitive 
and potentially contested areas of peace, that is, mainly its key actors, stakeholders, 
discourses, and the associated socio-political relationships, have often been left out of the 
debate. Rather has there been a conflation of material and social ownership. We therefore 
suggest that discussions around the extent to which local ownership has been created (or not) 
has to be approached in a more nuanced way, distinguishing between different types of 
attachment to peace and, as a result of this, more material and/or social forms of local 
ownership. Indeed, while in many cases material ownership is present on a deep level, social 
ownership risks being superficial and discursive. The link between material and social 
ownership is therefore not natural as often assumed, but politicised and conditional on the 
nature of peace that is being promoted as well as the networks of actors that engage with it, or 
refuse to do so. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo are two cases in which, as we argue, 
material ownership has failed to promote locally owned peace on a deep social level. It is not 
least due to this aspect that the success and failure of local ownership is deeply contested.  
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